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Spatial navigation can serve as a model system in cognitive neuroscience, in which specific neural represen-
tations, learning rules, and control strategies can be inferred from the vast experimental literature that exists
across many species, including humans. Here, we review this literature, focusing on the contributions of hip-
pocampal and striatal systems, and attempt to outline aminimal cognitive architecture that is consistent with
the experimental literature and that synthesizes previous related computational modeling. The resulting ar-
chitecture includes striatal reinforcement learning based on egocentric representations of sensory states and
actions, incidental Hebbian association of sensory information with allocentric state representations in the
hippocampus, and arbitration of the outputs of both systems based on confidence/uncertainty in medial pre-
frontal cortex. We discuss the relationship between this architecture and learning in model-free and model-
based systems, episodic memory, imagery, and planning, including some open questions and directions for
further experiments.Introduction
Goal-directed spatial navigation is a good model for general is-
sues in cognitive neuroscience. Like many daily tasks, goal-
directed navigation is a complex task that involves a variety of
sensory and proprioceptive stimuli, storage and recall of infor-
mation, and the elaboration of plans. Moreover, there is now
an unparalleled literature concerning the neural representations
involved (as reflected in the 2014 Nobel Prize, see e.g., Burgess,
2014) and a vast array of experimental data relating behavior to
environmental or neurophysiological manipulations.
There are many ways to find a goal location, and the relevant
cognitive functions have been categorized in various ways.
Here, we follow the nomenclature coming from behavioral and
lesion experiments in animals, following from the suggestion
that the hippocampus provides a ‘‘cognitive map’’ (O’Keefe and
Nadel, 1978; see below). Thus, one might navigate by following
a sensory cue that directly indicates the goal location (‘‘piloting’’),
by following a well-learned sequence of actions, each depending
on the previous action or a sensory cue (‘‘response learning’’ us-
ing ‘‘route’’ or ‘‘taxon’’ strategies), or by following a flexible internal
representation of spatial layout (‘‘place learning,’’ using a ‘‘cogni-
tivemap’’ or ‘‘locale’’ strategies). The emphasis on the ‘‘flexibility’’
of a cognitive map refers to the ability to use it from a new starting
location (which would undermine the use of a route) or in the
absence of subsets of specific sensory cues (which could under-
mine the use of piloting or route strategies). The hypothesis that
the hippocampus supports a flexible representation of the spatial
relationships present in the environment has been extended to
include non-spatial information in the relational theory of memory
function (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993), in addition to its as-
sociation with episodic memory rather than stimulus-response
learning (Hirsh, 1974; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978).
Here we examine the cognitive architecture of spatial naviga-
tion, with a focus on hippocampal and striatal systems and their64 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.interaction. We aim to outline the general principles that can be
derived from experimental data and how they constrain the
development of formal models of spatial cognition (see also
Box 1).
Brain Regions Associated with Spatial Navigation
Like any complex task, spatial navigation involves much of the
brain, not least sensory and motor areas. Here we review
some of the systems associated with specific roles in navigation.
The hippocampus has long been known to be important for
episodic memory (Scoville and Milner, 2000), and the discovery
of place cells drew attention to its role in spatial memory
(O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; see below). Subsequent experiments
using the Morris water maze (Morris et al., 1982), T maze alterna-
tion (e.g., Cohen et al., 1971), and the eight armmaze (e.g., Olton
et al., 1977) demonstrated certain aspects of navigation to be
particularly sensitive to hippocampal damage. These include
navigation to an unmarked location from variable start loca-
tions and navigation that requiresmemory (and potentially avoid-
ance) of previously visited locations. Equally importantly, control
conditions in these tasks showed insensitivity to hippocampal
damage when piloting or response learning was possible and
emphasized the importance of distal cues in orienting the animal
within its environment.
By contrast with the hippocampal formation, cortico-basal
ganglia circuits (loops) are thought to support stimulus-response
associations and procedural memories (which may underlie
route learning or piloting). For example, learning of probabilistic
rules can be spared in hippocampus-related amnesia but
impaired in conditions affecting the striatum, such as Hunting-
ton’s or Parkinson’s disease (Knowlton et al., 1996). These loops
connect specific neocortical areas unidirectionally to striatal
subregions, which project to downstream structures such as
the pallidum and the substantia nigra (SN). These areas connect
Figure 1. Simplified Schematic of the Cortical and Subcortical
Connections of the Hippocampus and the Striatum
Most of the hippocampus’s neocortical inputs come from the perirhinal and
parahippocampal cortices (data not shown), via the entorhinal cortex. The
striatum is part of the basal ganglia (including SNr, GP, SNc, and VTA), which
we have here represented in a compact form for the sake of clarity. The ‘‘dorsal
striatum’’ usually includes the caudate and putamen with the nucleus ac-
cumbens in the ‘‘ventral striatum.’’ Abbreviations: SNr/SNc, substantia nigra
pars reticulata/compacta; GP, globus pallidus; STN, sub thalamic nucleus;
VTA, ventral tegmental area.
Box 1. Current Status of the Field
d Multiple spatial representations have been identified in
neuronal firing and in behavior.
d There is a good mapping between representations and
brain systems.
d These systems appear to combine constructively to sup-
port spatial memory in a stable environment, which im-
plies that they can be selected between in an appropriate
manner, e.g., according to a measure of ‘‘confidence’’ in
each system (e.g., slope of value function).
d Different systems appear to use different learning rules,
potentially reflecting optimization for different aspects of
the task (one-shot learning for hippocampal episodic
memory, prediction error for striatal action learning).
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neocortical sites of origin. Within this picture, the striatum has
been subdivided into several functional regions: the dorsolateral
striatum (DLS) associated with stimulus-response learning and
habit formation, the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) associated
with action-outcome learning, and ventral striatum (VS) associ-
ated with motivational and affective processing (Packard and
McGaugh, 1992; Pennartz et al., 2011; Yin and Knowlton, 2006).
An important aspect of theorizing about the function of the
striatum concerns its dopaminergic input. In a series of influential
experiments, Schultz and colleagues recorded the firing of
dopamine neurons in the SN/VTA of monkeys performing condi-
tioning experiments. The firing of these neurons was found to be
consistent with dopaminergic signaling of the reward prediction
error (Schultz et al., 1997) used in theoretical models of reinforce-
ment learning (RL; Maia, 2009; Sutton and Barto, 1981). The
strong dopaminergic projections to the striatum strengthen its
association with RL, with suggestions that an actor/critic-type
functional architecture maymap onto dorsal and ventral striatum
respectively (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2004), albeit as a major
simplification of the actual functional and structural complexity
of the striatum (Bornstein and Daw, 2011). The VS also receives
strong projections from the hippocampus, potentially mediating
associations between the distinct types of representation in the
two systems (Pennartz et al., 2011; van der Meer et al., 2014; see
Figure 1).
In humans, the hippocampus has been specifically implicated
in accurate spatial navigation, both in terms of the effects of
lesions and metabolic activity during virtual navigation, although
showing a greater (right) lateralization of function than in rodents
(Burgess et al., 2002). Indeed, virtual reality analogs of behavioral
tests in rodents show similar associations of hippocampal and
striatal activity with place and response learning, respectively.
Thus, the expected dissociations are seen in terms of use of ex-
tra-maze cues and environmental boundaries compared to turns
and intra-maze cues (Doeller et al., 2008; Iaria et al., 2003) and
between wayfinding and route following (Hartley et al., 2003).
However, the idea of a ‘‘cognitive map’’ has been interpreted
in many ways, not all of which correspond to hippocampal
activity. For example, processing a bird’s eye view of the envi-
ronment, which could represent ‘‘survey knowledge’’ but isalso an egocentric representation, does not correlate with hippo-
campal activity (Shelton and Gabrieli, 2002).
Finally, we note the importance of the parietal cortex in spatial
processing. Damage to the posterior parietal cortex often results
in optic ataxia—impaired visuospatial coordination of reaching
and grasping, consistent with the presence there of neurons
tuned to encode the location of visual attention and aspects of
reaching and grasping (e.g., Hwang et al., 2014). A common
consequence of unilateral damage to the parietal cortex (most
often on the right side) is a clinical syndrome known as ‘‘unilateral
neglect’’: an impairment in noticing or paying attention to objects
and events in the contralateral hemifield, or the contralateral side
of objects. Patients suffering from unilateral neglect can experi-
ence ‘‘representational neglect,’’ affecting their spatial imagery
and memory performance, as distinct from the more common
perceptual neglect (Bisiach and Luzzatti, 1978), with neglect in
imagery (rather than perception) being more strongly linked to
deficits in navigation (Guariglia et al., 2005).
Neuronal Codes
Single neuron recordings from the hippocampus of freelymoving
rats showed the existence of ‘‘place cells’’ in regions CA1 and
CA3: cells that fire only when the animal is within a limited region
of the environment (O’Keefe and Dostrovsky, 1971). Place cell
firing patterns are established very rapidly when an animal enters
an environment for the first time and are stable over the course of
several days (Thompson and Best, 1990), although a slow diver-
gence of firing patterns in the same or similar environments is
seen in CA1 (Lever et al., 2002; Mankin et al., 2012; Ziv et al.,
2013). This ‘‘remapping’’ can also reflect changes in task re-
quirements (Markus et al., 1995) or goal locations (Dupret
et al., 2010). Place cell firing patterns ‘‘remap’’ rapidly between
distinct environments (Muller and Kubie, 1987) but are robustNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 65
Figure 2. Examples of Spatial Cells
Associated with Navigation, Recorded in
Freely Moving Rats, Showing Firing Rate
as a Function of Location or Head
Direction
(A) Place cells, found in areas CA3 and CA1 of the
hippocampus proper, typically fire in a restricted
portion of the environment.
(B) Grid cells, found in medial entorhinal cortex
and pre- and parasubiculum, typically fire in a
regular triangular array of locations. Directional
grid cells or ‘‘conjunctive’’ cells, whose grid-like
spatial firing is also modulated by head direction,
are also found in these regions.
(C) Head-direction cells, found in the presubiculum
and deep layers of medial entorhinal cortex, typi-
cally fire for a narrow range of allocentric heading
directions.
(D) Boundary cells, found in subiculum and ento-
rhinal cortex, typically fire at a specific distance from an environmental boundary along a specific allocentric direction.
(E) A trajectory neuron from parietal cortex, shown for outbound (upper plots) and inbound (lower plots) traversals of a path (dashed yellow lines).
Peak firing rate shown in Hz. (A)–(D) are dapted from Hartley et al. (2014); (E) is adapted from Nitz (2006), with permission.
Neuron
Perspectiveto smaller changes such as eliminating a subset of environmental
cues (O’Keefe and Conway, 1978; Quirk et al., 1990), indicating a
capacity for ‘‘pattern completion’’ (Marr, 1971) that is associated
with synaptic plasticity in CA3 (Nakazawa et al., 2002). Non-vi-
sual cues, like olfactory traces or auditory signals, can also
contribute to self-location and are sufficient to guide behavior
if visual cues are not accessible (Maaswinkel and Whishaw,
1999; Wallace et al., 2002). In addition, self-motion-related infor-
mation is an important input to place cell firing (see below), and
firing patterns also develop trajectory dependencewhen specific
trajectories are taken repeatedly in constrained environments
(McNaughton et al., 1983; Wood et al., 2000). Place cells have
subsequently been identified in a wide range of mammals
including bats and humans (Ekstrom et al., 2003; Ulanovsky
and Moss, 2007).
A complementary representation is provided by ‘‘head direc-
tion cells.’’ These neurons signal the orientation of the animal’s
head in the horizontal plane and are tuned to a narrow range
of head directions centered on a preferred firing direction (Taube
et al., 1990). These cells were first reported in the dorsal pre-
subiculum (Ranck, 1985; Taube et al., 1990) and later in a
network of structures along the classic Papez circuit, including
the thalamic nuclei (Mizumori and Williams, 1993; Taube,
1995), mammillary bodies (Stackman and Taube, 1998), and en-
torhinal cortex (Sargolini et al., 2006). Interestingly, if two cells
share a preferred firing direction in one environment, they will
continue to respond in the same way in a second environment
even if the absolute firing direction of both cells may have
changed (i.e., they remain ‘‘in register’’). The retrosplenial cortex
provides an important input to head direction cells and seems
specifically involved in associating representations of orienta-
tion to fixed elements of the external world (Clark et al., 2012;
Knight and Hayman, 2014). Head direction cells have been
found in other mammals, and results consistent with similar
directional representations have been seen in human retrosple-
nial andmedial parietal areas using fMRI (Baumann andMatting-
ley, 2012; Doeller et al., 2010; Marchette et al., 2014), including
activity correlating with allocentric navigation (Wolbers and
Bu¨chel, 2005).66 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.A third type of spatial cell, ‘‘grid cells,’’ is found in the medial
entorhinal cortex (mEC; Hafting et al., 2005) and subicular com-
plex (Boccara et al., 2010). They share some similarities with
place cells but have multiple firing fields arranged on an equilat-
eral triangular grid that covers the environment (Figure 2B). Grid
cells appear to be grouped into functional clusters within mEC
that share similar characteristics: neighboring cells possess
the same grid orientation and scale, having only a different trans-
lational offset, while the grid scale increases ventrally along the
mEC in discrete steps (Barry et al., 2007; Stensola et al., 2012).
Moreover, similarly to head direction cells, their relative position
is maintained even after environmental manipulations that
change or disrupt the fields of individual cells (Stensola et al.,
2012; Yoon et al., 2013). Again, these cells have been found in
a variety of mammals, including humans (Jacob et al., 2014),
and fMRI evidence suggests that they occur throughout the
autobiographical memory network (Doeller et al., 2010).
An important difference between grid cells and place cells is
that grid cell firing patterns contain non-local information and
so could provide ametric for large-scale navigation. Specifically,
the grid cell representations of two distant locations could allow
calculation of the translation vector between them (Bush et al.,
2015). By contrast, place cell representations of two locations
separated by more than the two place field widths contain no
such information (although place fields 10 m wide have been re-
ported; Kjelstrup et al., 2008).
The sources of information that dictate these spatial re-
sponses can be divided into self-motion and environmental
sensory inputs. The strong intrinsic organization of the firing pat-
terns of head direction and grid cells, irrespective of the sensory
environment, suggests a significant influence of self-motion.
Accordingly, models of head direction and grid cells often rely
on continuous attractor dynamics via symmetrical recurrent con-
nectivity (Fuhs and Touretzky, 2006; McNaughton et al., 2006;
Zhang, 1996). In these models, the spatial representation is up-
dated by self-motion (a process also known as ‘‘path integra-
tion’’) via asymmetric interactions (Zhang, 1996), which can be
achieved by cells with a conjunctive representations of space
and movement, such as head direction firing modulated by
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1998) or grid cells modulated by movement velocity (Sargolini
et al., 2006; see Burak and Fiete, 2009; Conklin and Eliasmith,
2005 for computational models).
However, all allocentric (i.e., world-centered) spatial signals
relying on self-motion (or ‘‘path integration’’) need resetting rela-
tive to the environment to avoid accumulating error. Corre-
spondingly, spatial firing patterns are strongly influenced by
the environment. Distant visual cues, where available, have a
controlling influence on head direction and the orientation of
other spatial responses (e.g., Taube et al., 1990). The boundaries
of an environment also appear to play an important role in deter-
mining the firing locations of place cells. Place cell firing patterns
across manipulations of environmental shape reflect conjunc-
tions of distances and allocentric directions to environmental
boundaries (Hartley et al., 2000; O’Keefe and Burgess, 1996),
whereas discrete intra-maze landmarks have relatively little influ-
ence (e.g., Cressant et al., 1997). The predicted ‘‘boundary vec-
tor cells’’ mediating this information were subsequently found in
subiculum (Barry et al., 2006; Lever et al., 2009) and mEC (Sol-
stad et al., 2008). Environmental boundaries also affect the firing
pattern (Barry et al., 2007) and orientation (Krupic et al., 2015;
Stensola et al., 2015) of grid cells, consistent with a role in
reducing cumulative error (Hardcastle et al., 2015). The complete
system probably combines environmental and self-motion infor-
mation to estimate location and orientation.
In contrast to the explicit representation of spatial information
in the hippocampal formation, the function of the striatum can be
interpreted as producing (value) outcome predictions. More pre-
cisely, since DLS receives input from the somatosensory and
motor cortices, it may code predictions about the execution
and sensing of specific movements (Voorn et al., 2004), whereas
the DMS processes inputs from dlPFC, mPFC, and anterior
cingulate cortex relating to more cognitive operations (Yin and
Knowlton, 2006). Moreover, neural activity in the striatum is
more strongly influenced by task stage (Barnes et al., 2005), be-
ing modulated by choice points, reward delivery, and stereo-
typed egocentric responses (Berke et al., 2009). However, these
responses do not specifically encode route-trajectory informa-
tion. Evidence for this type of information is found in the posterior
parietal cortex (PPC) of navigating rats (McNaughton et al., 1994;
Nitz, 2006). Interestingly, in a very structured environment, place
cell and grid cell firing patterns become more trajectory depen-
dent (Derdikman et al., 2009; McNaughton et al., 1983), suggest-
ing an influence from parietal cortex combined with a strong
contextual modulation (Whitlock et al., 2012). More generally,
parietal neurons tend to code all phases of the action sequences
used to solve or plan a task (Fogassi et al., 2005; Harvey et al.,
2012).
Posterior parietal neurons in monkeys can exhibit conjunctive
‘‘gain field’’ responses tuned to visual (retinotopic) receptive
fields but modulated by eye, head, or body position (Andersen,
1995; Snyder et al., 1998). These responses may allow determi-
nation of the location of visual objects relative to the body or in a
world-referenced frame (Pouget and Sejnowski, 1997). In partic-
ular, area 7a, which contains neurons with world-referenced gain
fields (Snyder et al., 1998), projects to the parahippocampal
gyrus and presubiculum and so may allow translation betweenegocentric parietal representations and allocentric medial tem-
poral representations (Burgess et al., 2001; Wilber et al., 2014),
potentially mediated by retrosplenial cortex (Byrne et al., 2007;
Dhindsa et al., 2014; Lambrey et al., 2012). The distinction be-
tween egocentric and allocentric representations is useful in out-
lining the cognitive architecture of navigation. However, we do
notmean to imply a strict dichotomy. For example, egocentric in-
formation (e.g., tactile and motoric inputs) can influence place
cell firing rates, and striatal or parietal mechanisms can direct ac-
tion toward a location in the world.
Systems Neuroscience of Spatial Learning
The dependence of place cell firing on environmental boundaries
rather than intra-maze landmarks is also reflected in hippo-
campal-dependent navigation. Pearce et al. (1998) adapted the
water maze by adding a local cue at a fixed bearing from the
submerged escape platform (Figure 3A). Rats learn relatively
direct paths to the goal over the course of a few trials. After
four trials (one session), the escape platform and the landmark
are moved together to a new location. Rats with and without hip-
pocampal lesions both are able to reach the hidden platform but
present distinct performance curves. Hippocampal lesion ani-
mals quickly locate the platform on the first trial of a new session,
using the intramaze landmark as a cue (i.e., following a ‘‘piloting’’
strategy), whereas the control animals are slower, continuing
to search at the previous location in the maze (i.e., following
a cognitive map strategy). On the other hand, control animals
learn the new location within each session and out-perform the
lesioned animals by the fourth trial of the session. Thus, the hip-
pocampus appears to support learning of the platform location
relative to the maze, rather than the landmark, which can hinder
performance when the platform location is moved. Moving the
maze relative to the testing room confirms that the rats are using
the boundary of the maze in combination with distal cues for
orientation (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2007).
The distinct styles of learning supported by hippocampal and
striatal systems are further illustrated by experiments using a
‘‘plus’’ maze (Packard and McGaugh, 1996; after Cohen et al.,
1971). Rats were trained to approach a consistently baited arm
in the plus maze, starting from the stem (Figure 3B). After several
days, a single probe trial was given, in which rats were placed in
a start arm opposite that used in training (see Figure 3). Control
rats displayed ‘‘place learning’’ (i.e., going to the same allocen-
tric location in the maze) on the day 8 probe trial and ‘‘response
learning’’ (i.e., making the same body turn) on the day 16 probe
trial, indicating that with extended training there is a shift in the
systems controlling behavior. Supporting this interpretation,
rats with inactivation of the striatum displayed place learning
on both day 8 and day 16 probe trials, whereas rats with inacti-
vation of the dorsal hippocampus showed no preference for
place or response learning on the day 8 probe trial but displayed
response learning on the day 16 probe trial. Thus, it seems
that response learning, i.e., association of reward with a body
turn, depends on the striatum while place learning, i.e., associa-
tion of reward with an environmental location, depends on the
hippocampus.
These behavioral results show nice agreement with neural
firing properties, but we should note that mapping betweenNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 67
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Figure 3. Examples of the Hippocampal and Striatal Contributions to Spatial Navigation
(A) Schematic of thewater maze used by Pearce et al. (1998). A submerged platform (white circle) and intra-maze landmark (black circle) are placed in themaze at
eight different locations on different sessions but always with a fixed offset from each other.
(B) Schematic of the plus maze used by Packard and McGaugh (1996). Rats learn to find the food placed at the end of an arm from the start location. In un-
rewarded probe trials, the rat’s starting position is moved to the opposite side of the maze.
(C) The mean escape latency for the first (continuous line) and fourth (dashed line) trials in each of the 11 sessions for the control and hippocampal lesion rats.
Adapted from Pearce et al. (1998). The hippocampal rats perform better at the start of each session, the control rats at the end of each session.
(D) Proportion of rats in the probe trials on days 8 and 16, with either lidocaine or saline injections in the caudate nucleus or hippocampus. Light bars indicate those
showing a ‘‘place’’ strategy (i.e., going to the rewarded location in the room), while dark bars indicate those showing a ‘‘response’’ strategy (i.e., making the
rewarded body-turn). The place strategy is sensitive to hippocampal inactivation on day 8, the response strategy to caudate inactivation on day 16. Adapted from
Packard and McGaugh (1996).
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complicated by the presence of multiple systems. Thus, neural
responses in one systemmay not correspond to behaviors being
controlled in part by another system. For example, an intact hip-
pocampus may be required for the initial learning of a goal loca-
tion in the corner of a box, but not when the task has been
learned for many days (at which point it appears to be indepen-
dent of place cell remapping (Jeffery et al., 2003). Equally, neuro-
logical patients with hippocampal damage may perform well on
tests of allocentric spatial memory, especially when sufficient
alternative representations could have been formed prior to
the damage, for example in the striatum (see, e.g., Moscovitch
et al., 2006 for discussion).
Learning Rules in Spatial Navigation
There is a long history of debate concerning the nature of spatial
learning, spanning from the proponents of stimulus-response
associative learning mechanisms driven by trial and error (Hull,
1943; Mackintosh, 1983; Rescorla andWagner, 1972) to the pro-68 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.ponents of incidental learning of internal representations capable
of supporting cognition (Tolman, 1948). These arguments are
brought to current thinking on spatial navigation in terms of
reinforcement learning (RL) based on prediction error (Foster
et al., 2000; Maia, 2009; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton
and Barto, 1981) and the proposal that the hippocampus is a
‘‘cognitive map’’ (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978) or relational (Cohen
and Eichenbaum, 1993) or episodic (Hirsh, 1974; Scoville and
Milner, 2000) memory system.
The chief characteristic of RL is that it relies on prediction er-
ror, i.e., the difference between actual reward and expectation
based on experience, as opposed to a memory system that re-
lies on incidental one-shot association. There are several conse-
quences of relying on a single prediction error signal. One is that
only the amount of future reward associated with a choice can be
used to direct behavior, but not the type of reward. To include
behavior that can be ‘‘goal directed’’ (i.e., aimed at a specific
type of reward) requires a more elaborate model of the world,
Neuron
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consequence is that learning outcomes based on multiple cues
will show ‘‘blocking’’ and ‘‘overshadowing’’ (Kamin, 1969; Pav-
lov, 1927) between cues. Thus, if a first stimulus already fully pre-
dicts reward, learning about a second stimulus that might also
predict reward will be ‘‘blocked’’ as there is no prediction error,
and partial association of one stimulus to reward reduces the
strength of association of a second concurrent cue to reward.
A recent experiment used a virtual reality adaptation of the
Pearce et al. (1998) rodent experiment to test whether different
types of learning occur within hippocampal and striatal systems
in humans (following Hirsh, 1974; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). Us-
ing fMRI, this experiment showed that learning object locations
relative to the environmental boundary correlated with hippo-
campal activity, whereas learning object locations relative to
an intra-maze landmark correlated with activity in striatum (and
also parietal cortex; Doeller et al., 2008; Doeller and Burgess,
2008). Moreover, parallel behavioral experiments showed that
learning relative to an intra-maze landmark is blocked and over-
shadowed by a second cue (whether a landmark or boundary),
whereas learning relative to an environmental boundaries is
not—occurring incidentally to other cues (Doeller and Burgess,
2008).
Taken together, these results suggest that the striatum uses
RL to associate actions to specific stimuli or landmarks that pre-
dict reward (including good performance in the case of consci-
entious human participants). Whereas the hippocampus forms
incidental associations between objects (which might include,
but is not restricted to, rewarding objects) and the environmental
locations in which they are encountered. The diverse functions
and learning rules of these two systems beg the question of
how they interact to support a common behavioral outcome. In
this context, we note that a large body of research has high-
lighted the role of the prefrontal cortex in the control and organi-
zation of goal-directed behavior (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999;
Watanabe, 1996), the monitoring of ongoing voluntary action se-
quences (Gehring and Knight, 2000), the planning and selection
of appropriate actions based on anticipated reward (Petrides,
1995; Rowe et al., 2000), and the ability to learn the contingency
between actions and specific outcomes (Balleine and Dickinson,
1998).
The rodent medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) comprises the
ventral infralimbic cortex underneath the more dorsal prelimbic
and anterior cingulate regions. The former region projects to a
variety of limbic and autonomic regions, including the hypo-
thalamus, the amygdala, and the shell region of the nucleus
accumbens. In contrast, the more dorsal prelimbic region of
PFC projects to core regions of the nucleus accumbens and to
dorso-medial regions of the dorsal striatum, and has reciprocal
indirect connections with premotor and motor cortices. Direct
projections to the mPFC stem from the CA1/subiculum of
the ventral part of the hippocampus (vHPC) (see Figure 1; e.g.,
Berendse et al., 1992; van Strien et al., 2009). Cells in mPFC
can exhibit location-specific firing and lesion in vHPC disrupts
goal-related activity (Burton et al., 2009). Anatomical connectiv-
ity suggests that the mPFC could be capable of integrating infor-
mation from brain regions mediating (and even overriding) appe-
titive and emotional motivation and goal-directed and habitualresponses (Smith and Graybiel, 2013; Killcross and Coutureau,
2003). Consistent with this idea, Doeller et al. (2008) found
that, while activity in either hippocampus or striatum indicated
use of the corresponding strategy, increased mPFC activity
was seen when both systems were similarly active—suggesting
a role in mediating between them.
Toward a Computational Account of Spatial Navigation
In this section, we first briefly review classical computational
models of how the hippocampus and the striatum might support
spatial navigation and then describe recent developments that
try to reproduce the experimental and neurophysiological data
reviewed above.
A number of earlier models of navigation combine the unsu-
pervised learning of place representation with variants of RL
(Brown and Sharp, 1995; Foster et al., 2000). However, this is
somewhat at odds with the idea of a distinct rapid incidental
learning system in the hippocampus in combination with a
slower RL mechanism (see above and Lengyel and Dayan,
2007; Sheynikhovich et al., 2009) and related proposals for com-
plementary hippocampal and neocortical learning systems
(Marr, 1971, 1970; McClelland et al., 1995). Viewed as a memory
system, learning in the hippocampus need not be driven by
reward—its function may be to represent experience (e.g.,
what is encountered where, for navigation) so that it is available
to future planning in which new goals may be specified. In this
case, currently unrewarding stimuli may become important in
the future and so also need to be remembered. Nonetheless, en-
codingmay be biased toward stimuli that are novel, for efficiency
in encoding, or toward stimuli that precede a rewarding event
(see e.g., McNamara et al., 2014).
Another family of models (Blum and Abbott, 1996; Dolle´ et al.,
2010; Martinet et al., 2011; Muller et al., 1996) utilizes the
hippocampus to build graph-like representations of the environ-
ment for use in path planning using activity propagation
methods. The connectivity between place cells can in principle
support multiple graph-like representations (Samsonovich and
McNaughton, 1997), and propagating activity is observed in
place cells (e.g., Johnson and Redish, 2007; Pfeiffer and Foster,
2013). However, one issue faced by these models concerns the
use of experience-dependent graph learning, which would bias
behavior toward well-learned routes: an outcome more associ-
ated with the striatum.
Taking inspiration from these previous works, below we out-
line a minimal cognitive architecture that satisfies the functional
and biological constraints reviewed above. For simplicity, we
consider four main components: sensory cortex, the hippocam-
pus, the striatum, and the prefrontal cortex (see Figure 4).
We assume that sensory cortex supports a representation of
the identity and distance to objects within the view field relative
to the position and direction of the head (i.e., in an egocentric
frame of reference). This sensory information, or ‘‘sensory snap-
shot,’’ reaches both hippocampal and striatal systems. Below
we describe the different ways in which the two systems would
process this information in the tasks described above (Figure 3).
As noted above, the dorsal striatum is thought to be in-
volved in reinforcement learning of stimulus-response associa-
tions. That is, it may learn sensory motor associations usingNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 69
Figure 4. A Minimal Cognitive Architecture for Spatial Navigation
Schematic representation of a minimal circuit for two of the main mechanisms
that guide spatial navigation: the hippocampus, providing the ‘‘cognitive map’’
with information about locations for goal-directed decision making, and the
striatum that learns stimulus-response associations. Note that the same
sensory input is used in different ways by the two systems. Basic sensory
inputs reach both the striatum and the hippocampus: the former learns only
when a reward signal is provided (there is no flexible goal); the latter receives
additional information about the head direction and a learning signal when an
important location (e.g., a goal) has been reached. Each area outputs the
estimated optimal action (i.e., the turning angle), which is then compared and
chosen by the prefrontal cortex.
Box 2. Future Directions
d How do the hippocampal and striatal systems influence
each other during learning, and do both contribute to the
calculation of a single prediction error?
d Does efficient navigation in complex environments require
combinations of memory-based and reinforcement-based
representations?
d What is the nature of the neural representation in the stria-
tum and parietal cortex that support landmark-related and
response learning?
d What is the exact role of ‘‘forward sweeps’’ of place cell
activity and how do they contribute to planning?
d Are the representationsofplacesanddistancesdistortedby
the frequency with which a route is taken, and could this
problem be solved by the intrinsic regularity of grid cells?
d How is fast incidental learning implemented at a neuronal
level? What determines which information is stored and
which is discarded, and what role does temporal structure
play?
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pected by a ventral striatal ‘‘critic’’ and the actual outcome in
order to produce (statistically) correct associations. Thus, the
dorsal and ventral striatum, respectively, have been thought of
as approximating an ‘‘actor-critic’’ architecture for reinforcement
learning (Bornstein and Daw, 2011; Pennartz et al., 2011), in
which the prediction error signal is encoded by variation in dopa-
mine (Schultz et al., 1997). Extending this line of thought, recent
theories propose that different types of learning coexist within
the striatum: the DLS may function as a model-free actor, while
the DMS implements an additional model-based RL system.
Furthermore, the ventral striatal critic may also consist of sepa-
rate modules for model-based and model-free Pavlovian evalu-
ation. In this view, the successes of dopamine-dependent
learning models are preserved, and the resistance of instru-
mental learning to lesions of dopaminergic nuclei can be ex-
plained (Bornstein and Daw, 2011).
Given the egocentric nature of the sensory input, in which
distal orientation cues are not specifically salient, the striatum
will learn to associate egocentric sensory representations with
egocentric actions that lead to reward (see also FitzGerald
et al., 2014; Sheynikhovich et al., 2009 for discussion of how
the nature of striatal state representations may be shaped by
RL). In the Pearce et al. (1998) version of the water maze, for
example, the most salient (reward-predictive) feature will be
the intra-maze landmark due to its proximity to the submerged
platform. Thus, striatal control of behavior will direct the animal
to search near to the landmark. Equally, at the choice point of
the plus maze used by Packard and McGaugh (1996), the70 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.egocentric sensory input will be similar from both training and
probe directions. Thus, under striatal control of behavior, the
sensory input associated with a specific action (body turn) during
learning will also be driven by the sensory input at the choice
point during probe trials.
By contrast, we suppose that the hippocampal system re-
ceives head direction information as well as sensory snapshots,
so that boundary-vector cell responses can be formed to drive
an allocentric place cell representation (although note that tra-
jectory dependence might re-emerge in future models, see
Box 2). Thus, the hippocampus represents states in a way that
is relatively insensitive to body orientation and to discrete intra-
maze landmarks compared to extended environmental features.
On encountering an object of interest (e.g., a food reward or sub-
merged platform, or a neutral object), its location can be stored
by unsupervised Hebbian learning of connections from place
cells to ‘‘goal cells’’ coding for that type of object, which might
be located in subiculum, ventral striatum, or prefrontal cortex
(e.g., Hok et al., 2005). The firing of these cells will then provide
a value function for navigation to the object of interest—
increasing with proximity to it as more of the place cells with
potentiated synapses become active (Burgess and O’Keefe,
1996; see Figure 5). This mechanism, mediated by place cells,
is restricted to distances of the order of the size the largest place
fields (10 m; Kjelstrup et al., 2008). Larger-scale navigation
would have to rely on learned associations between place cells
(see ‘‘forward sweeps,’’ below) or on the large-scale coding
properties of grid cells (Bush et al., 2015).
Although such goal cells would provide an indication of how
close the animal is to the desired location, they would not indi-
cate in which direction to move to reach it. However, the tempo-
ral characteristics of place cell firing (‘‘theta phase precession’’;
O’Keefe and Recce, 1993) are such that within each cycle of
the theta rhythm, the location represented by the currently active
subset of place cells ‘‘sweeps forward’’ from behind to in
front of the animal (Burgess et al., 1994; Johnson and Redish,
Figure 5. Schematic of HowFiring Fields of Different Place Cells Can
Be Combined to Obtain a Global Value Function that Can Be Used to
Reach Rewarding Locations
The left panel shows an example with few neurons: when the rat reaches the
rewarding site (in the center of the figures), fast Hebbian learning takes place
between place cells that are active in that location (place field centers repre-
sented by black dots) and a ‘‘goal cell’’ downstream (e.g., in subiculum, ventral
striatum, or prefrontal cortex, firing rate shown in false color). In this location,
the activity of the goal cell is high (yellow colors).When the ratmoves away from
this location, fewer of the place cells with potentiated synapses will be active
and therefore the firing rate will be lower (blue colors). The right panel shows
an example with many place cells: when the number of place cells increases,
the resulting value function (i.e., goal cell firing rate) becomes more regular.
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of the suitability and the value of the current direction of
travel. ‘‘Forward sweeps’’ and ‘‘backward sweeps’’ are also
observed during non-locomotor behavior and sleeping (Wilson
and McNaughton, 1993), with backward sweeps more prevalent
after novel experience and so associated with consolidation
(Diba and Buzsa´ki, 2007; Foster and Wilson, 2006) and forward
sweeps associated with planning of upcoming trajectories
(Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013). The proximity relationships between
place cells, as read out by forward sweeps, implicitly encode a
model of state transitions that reflects spatial structure, which
may also be influenced by the presence of reward (O´lafsdo´ttir
et al., 2015; Wikenheiser and Redish, 2013).
In order to produce a motor action or simply a decision, given
the potentially different outputs from hippocampal and striatal
systems, with the former having a much more cognitive char-
acter, a mechanism is necessary to compare these outputs
and decide which is the most appropriate for the task at hand.
One ideal candidate for this function is medial prefrontal cortex,
given the fact that the comparison probably involves also the
estimation of quantities such as confidence and value of infor-
mation and taking into account previous decisions and out-
comes (Barraclough et al., 2004). We suppose that this area
selects between the possible actions indicated by either system
based on the slopes of the associated value functions as a proxy
for the confidence or uncertainty of the outputs of either system
(Daw et al., 2005; Keramati et al., 2011). Accordingly, the time
course of learning in the Packard and McGaugh (1996) experi-
ment indicates slower striatal learning and lower confidence
early on, resulting in hippocampal control of behavior, but the
striatal system eventually achieves greater confidence and gains
control of behavior. Similarly, in the Pearce et al. (1998) experi-
ment, the intact animals show hippocampal control during the
first trial of a new session—responding relative to the boundary
of the maze, oriented by distal cues, and so performing worsethan hippocampal lesion animals, due to the movement of the
platform relative to the maze. On later trials within each session,
however, the lesioned animals have improved little, with the
intact animals now out-performing them.
Discussion
Taking inspiration from behavioral, lesion and inactivation, neu-
roimaging, and electrophysiological studies together with ex-
isting computational models, we sought to outline a minimal
cognitive architecture for spatial navigation. Principal functional
components of this architecture include the basal ganglia/stria-
tum and the hippocampal formation, the former using local, in-
cremental, and statistically efficient reinforcement learning rules,
and the latter using a one-shot incidental learning rule. The stria-
tal system can efficiently learn to solve key experimental tasks,
such as the water maze and the plus maze, but its learning is
slow and behavior is characterized by the egocentric nature of
the sensory state information and the coding of actions.
By contrast, the hippocampus possesses a goal-independent
representation of space that is learned rapidly, perhaps reflect-
ing its role in episodic memory. This is obtained by having place
cells initially driven in a fixed feedforward manner by their prox-
imity relations to environmental boundaries (see e.g., Hartley
et al., 2000), followed by slower adjustments as an environment
becomes familiar (see e.g., Barry and Burgess, 2007; Lever et al.,
2002) and the potentially related adjustment of grid cells (Barry
et al., 2012). When an object or goal is encountered, ‘‘goal’’ cells
can be formed by rapid incidental Hebbian learning in connec-
tions from place cells, so that their activity can provide gradients
that can be used for goal-directed navigation (Burgess and
O’Keefe, 1996; Foster et al., 2000). Behavior in this case is char-
acterized by the allocentric nature of the representations of cur-
rent and goal locations.
These two systems appear to play complementary roles at
different stages of spatial learning. The hippocampus provides
an initial rapid associative memory for associations between a
goal (or a neutral object) and its context (environmental location
in this case) that can guide goal-directed navigation in response
to an explicit desire for that goal. However, the contextual
association (in this case place cells) provides a similarity
gradient that might not be sufficient to support navigation within
complex environments. By contrast, the striatal reinforcement
learning mechanism is capable of learning the statistics of the
task over multiple trials, and thus potentially learning state-ac-
tion trajectories that cannot be directly inferred from contextual
similarity.
The outputs of these two systems must be coordinated by a
third component, potentially corresponding to medial prefrontal
cortex (see also Chersi and Pezzulo, 2012; Dolle´ et al., 2010;
Sheynikhovich et al., 2009). Themost obviousmechanism for se-
lection is a comparison of the ‘‘confidence’’ in movement direc-
tions signaled by either system, possibly utilizing the local
gradient of the normalized value function expressed by each
system. This proposed architecture relates to more general
models of decision making (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan, 2009),
which emphasize that goal-directed and habitual mechanisms
of choice are linked to model-based and model-free methods
of reinforcement learning, respectively.Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 71
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e.g., sensitive to devaluation of the type of reward) mechanisms
onto hippocampal and striatal learning systems is not straight
forward. Both mechanisms may exist outside of the hippocam-
pus, with some authors implicating striatum in habitual learning
and prefrontal cortex in goal-directed learning. In this context,
the hippocampal system can be seen as a ‘‘third way’’ (Lengyel
and Dayan, 2007): it is not just another model-based reinforce-
ment learning system but appears to be best characterized by
one-shot incidental learning of specific examples, as consistent
with its well-recognized role in episodic memory (Cohen and Ei-
chenbaum, 1993; Hirsh, 1974; O’Keefe andNadel, 1978; Scoville
and Milner, 2000).
Nonetheless, the hippocampal system can certainly play the
role of the ‘‘model’’ in a model-based learning system. Specif-
ically, the relationship between an explicit memory system and
a means of generating imagery for planning is now being re-
cognized. Thus, the hippocampus can be seen as the highest
level in a generative model capable of consolidating memory in
neocortex (Ka´li and Dayan, 2004, 2000). It can also be seen as
a system for enabling information from long-term memory to
be rendered in parietal cortex as a coherent egocentric spatial
scene consistent with a single viewpoint (Burgess et al., 2001;
Byrne et al., 2007). This would explain the hippocampal role
in imagery for spatial layout (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007;
Schacter and Addis, 2007), but not for single objects (Kim
et al., 2015). In either case, the hippocampal system can be
used to generate information corresponding to upcoming states
for use in planning, as consistent with recent experiments
showing that self-generated place cell sequences do not ne-
cessarily reproduce the animal’s most frequent behavior and
instead sometimes generate paths never traversed by the animal
(Gupta et al., 2010; O´lafsdo´ttir et al., 2015).
Within the view of the hippocampus as a generative model
or means of imagining future states, the imagined movement
of the agent could be achieved by iterative interactions with
parietal cortex (Byrne et al., 2007; Chersi et al., 2013) or by the
generation of ‘‘forward sweeps’’ of place cell representations
either during theta states (Burgess et al., 1994; Johnson and
Redish, 2007; Singer et al., 2013; Skaggs et al., 1996) or offline
‘‘replay’’ (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013; Wilson and McNaughton,
1993). These schemes can be seen as architectures for iterative
decisionmaking (Penny et al., 2013) andmay enable the striatum
to access the expected value associated with specific environ-
mental locations (Lansink et al., 2008; van der Meer and Redish,
2009). In the context of imagery and planning, the medial pre-
frontal and striatal areas appear to be involved in representing
the reward value of elements of imagined scenarios (Benoit
et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2015).
Open Questions
The tremendous amount of knowledge about the functioning of
spatial navigation mechanisms, reviewed above, gives rise to
several open questions, which we discuss below, and summa-
rize as a brief list of future directions in Box 2.
Although the hippocampus and the striatum appear to learn by
two very different mechanisms, how does each system influence
the other during learning? Does the information from the hippo-
campus directly contribute to the calculation of the prediction72 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.error in the striatal system, or is its influence only indirect via
behavior (e.g., providing examples of successful routes early in
learning)? Although experimental manipulations can bring the
outputs of both systems into conflict, there is little evidence of
direct competition between them (i.e., mutual inhibition) rather
than greater activity in whichever system is controlling behavior
(Doeller et al., 2008). A puzzle here is that if hippocampal informa-
tion is available to the ‘‘critic,’’ early hippocampal learning would
block subsequent learning by the striatum, but if it is not, why
does learning locations relative to the boundary block learning
to relative to the landmark in Doeller and Burgess (2008)?
The vast amount of experimental data, both behavioral and
neurophysiological, acquired in simpleenvironmentsallows rather
precise hypotheses on the functioning of spatial navigationmech-
anisms. On the contrary, information from complex mazes is less
complete and less is known about planning and decision making
in these environments, and how this kind of knowledge is repre-
sented in the brain. It may be that combinations ofmemory-based
and reinforcement-based learning are employed, such as eligi-
bility traces or saliency-based learning. Thus, it may be that the
trajectory dependence of place cell firing in constrained environ-
ments (e.g.,Wood et al., 2000) reflects the experience-dependent
modifications of a purely spatial code to aid navigation in complex
environments (e.g., Stachenfeld et al., 2014).
The striatum and parietal cortex are strongly implicated in sup-
porting landmark-related and response learning, but our knowl-
edge of the neural representations supporting these behaviors is
still incomplete. Are similar representations present in both re-
gions, or are there multiple such representations, and if so
what are they like? The Packard and McGaugh (1996) study im-
plies striatal encoding of an egocentric body turn, whereas the
Pearce et al., (1998) study implies that hippocampal lesion ani-
mals can navigate to an allocentric vector from a landmark; how-
ever, it is possible that their sub-optimal performance reflects a
failure of allocentric representation (e.g., having to circle the
landmark).
‘‘Forward sweeps’’ of place cell activity have been implicated
in planning of future trajectories. However, the mechanisms
behind these sweeps, and how they could be directed or used
for ‘‘mental exploration,’’ remain unclear. Critical questions
concern the relationship between forward sweeps combined
with ripples during stationary periods and those that occur as a
consequence of theta phase precession during locomotion,
and how both of these relate to behavioral choices during free
navigation of complex environments rather than well-practiced
trajectories.
One mechanism for using place cells to guide navigation (e.g.,
Blum and Abbott, 1996) and potentially to relating to forward
sweeps is to form experience-dependent associations between
place cells along frequently taken routes. However, this means
that the inferred distances between places will be distorted by
the frequency with which a route is taken, rather than reflecting
distance per se. A potential solution for large-scale vector navi-
gation could be to make use of the intrinsic metrical regularity of
grid cell firing patterns to infer the translation vector between
locations (Bush et al., 2015), but only if they are able to provide
global metrical representations of complex environments, as
indicated by Carpenter et al. (2015).
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learning, consistent with its role in episodic memory, but how
exactly would such a fast, incidental, learning rule work? En-
counters with non-rewarding objects are encoded into episodic
memory, but not all coincidences of stimuli can be encoded:
what determines which are and which are not forgotten? Do
they have to be followed by a significant (e.g., rewarding) event
as per schema theory (Tse et al., 2007). Novelty must boost
learning (e.g., one-shot learning is presumably restricted to the
first experience), but how does the role of novelty in the hippo-
campus compare to that of reward prediction error in the stria-
tum, and do both involve dopamine (e.g., Guitart-Masip et al.,
2014)? In addition, is the temporal or ordinal structure of the
task being represented in place cell firing, which could explain
the temporal evolution of firing patterns in CA1 (Kraus et al.,
2013; Mankin et al., 2012; Manns et al., 2007; Ziv et al., 2013),
consistent with the use of temporal context in memory retrieval
(e.g., Howard and Kahana, 1999)?
Conclusion
We hope to have shown that spatial navigation can serve as a
model system in cognitive neuroscience, in which specific repre-
sentations, learning rules, and control strategies can be inferred
from the vast experimental literature that exists across many
species, including humans. In this brief Perspective, we have at-
tempted to outline a minimal cognitive architecture consistent
with the most obvious of these inferences, both to demonstrate
its utility as a model system and to encourage further theoretical
and experimental elaboration.
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